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I. Introduction
This article focuses on innovation by outlining the history of medium-
sized chemical companies in Japan and analyzes the factors that resulted
in their success１）.
Industrialized countries always face attempts to keep pace with the
economic challenges of emerging countries, which have recently entered
the industrialization phase, irrespective of era or region. The development
of technology standards in emerging countries allows them to enter
product areas that were initially monopolized by industrialized countries.
Such competitive situations result in industrialized countries losing their
competitive advantage to emerging countries, which often have lower
labor and production costs. In the1980s, Japan demonstrated enormous
competitive strength on an international level in the electronics industry.
However, in recent years, with the emergence and growth of companies
based in Taiwan, China, and Korea, the market share of Japan’s electron-
ics companies have fallen into a slump. Sony’s FY2012 ending deficit
balance was recorded at its worst. Similarly, Panasonic and Sharp
recorded large-scale deficits for the same fiscal year. Evidently, the future
of Japan’s electronic industry is in jeopardy.
Innovation in the Japanese Chemical Industry,
Which Supports World Electronics Industry
So Hirano
１） The content of this paper is largely based on Kikkawa and Hirano (2011).
― ―９７
To ensure that the decline of specific industries does not cause the
overall decline of the economy, industrialized countries face the necessity
of perpetually fostering new pivotal industries. However, the development
of these industries is rather difficult. The reason for this difficulty is easily
understood by exemplifying the state of the U.K., formerly known as the
“world’s factory.” In fact, Japan currently finds itself in the same predica-
ment as the U.K. Despite the slump in the electronics industry, which was
once the driving force behind the Japanese economy, no enterprises in
other growing industries have emerged to assume the role of a leader for
the next generation. For example, Japan’s development in the IT industry,
has fallen short of other industrialized nations. Japan is yet to create a
company in the IT sector that is strong enough to compete with interna-
tional companies such as Apple and Google. Furthermore, Japan has failed
to develop a biotechnology industry.
In this current state, Japan’s chemical industry can be considered a
pivotal industry for the next generation. The remainder of this paper
attempts to clarify four points: (1) Why are expectations focused on the
chemical industry in Japan? (2) Within the chemical industry, which
companies have a strong competitive edge? When answering this question,
it becomes clear that medium-sized companies commonly possess this
edge. (3) Why is it that medium-sized companies and not large enterprises
have a competitive edge? (4) What successes have these companies
garnered? By examining historical cases, this article focuses on innova-
tions that have led to these companies’ success.
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II. Why are expectations focused on the chemical industry in
Japan?
There is low domestic familiarity with Japan’s chemical industry. For
example, the public response to the question, “Which Japanese enterprises
are you familiar with?” is likely to be answered with electronics or
automobile companies, such as “Sony” or “Toyota,” and not chemical
companies. Furthermore, although a review of academic research provides
sufficient information on Japan’s international competitiveness, most of it
cites non-chemical industries, such as the automobile industry (Clark and
Fujimoto 1991). There is little research that deals with Japan’s chemical
industry.
One reason for such low public familiarity with Japan’s chemical
industry is the nature of the chemical industry itself. Because most chemi-
cal products are industrial goods, and not consumer goods, the average
consumer is unaware of the utility of such products and does not have as
much opportunity to directly see the products.
However, there are two fundamental reasons for this lack of aware-
ness: (1) no Japanese chemical company ranks among the world’s top 10,
and (2) profitability of Japan’s large-scale chemical companies is rela-
tively low. As seen in Table 1, although Mitsubishi Chemical Corp. has
the largest turnover in Japan, it ranks only 14th worldwide and has rela-
tively low profitability.
In fact, there are many products that we use in our daily lives that are
produced by Japan’s chemical industry. For example, the liquid crystal
displays (LCD) in notebook computers, which many of us use, are largely
made from materials produced by Japanese companies. In addition, mostly
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Japanese companies also produce the materials for lithium ion batteries
that are installed in notebook computers and other products.
There are three specific arguments that support the plausibility of the
chemical industry becoming a pivotal one for the next generation in Japan.
First, Japanese companies hold a large global share in the area of
specialized chemicals. As seen in Figure 1, the global market scale for
specialized chemical products is smaller than that of Japan’s former
Table1. Sales and Net Operating Profit in Chemical Department (2008)
Rank Company Nationality
Sales
(US$
Millions)
Net
Operating
Profit
(US$
Millions)
ROS
１ BASF Germany ７０，４８５ ３，８５７ ５．５％
２ Dow Chemical USA ５７，５１４ ２，１７２ ３．８％
３ Ineos Group England ４７，０００ ― ―
４ LyondellBasell Netherlands ３８，４２０ ―３，０７９ ―８．０％
５ ExxonMobil USA ３８，３８８ ２，９５７ ７．７％
６ SABIC Saudi Arabia ３４，４０７ ９，７６９ ２８．４％
７ Sinopec China ３３，７９５ ―１，９２１ ―５．７％
８ DuPont USA ３０，３８７ ２，８０６ ９．２％
９ Total France ２９，６７６ ―８５ ―０．３％
１０ Taiwan Plastics Group Taiwan ２７，４７６ １，３２２ ４．８％
１４ Mitsubishi Chemical HD Japan １８，６１４ ―６４２ ―３．４％
１９ Mitsui Chemicals Japan １４，３８８ ４４０ ３．１％
２８ Shin-Etsu Chemical Japan １１，６１４ ２，２５３ １９．４％
― JSR Japan ４，０６１ ５９８ １４．７％
― Tokuyama Japan ２，２１３ ３５２ １５．９％
― Kuraray Japan ２，２８９ ３７８ １６．５％
― Nissan Chemical Industries Japan １，４５０ １３６ ９．４％
Source: “Chemical Economics” vol.57, no.4; Each Company’s Annual Reports.
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pivotal industries, such as automobiles, electronics, and electronic compo-
nents. However, Japanese companies’ global share of specialized chemical
components, such as polarization plate protection film for LCDs and the
material used in lithium ion batteries, is at the high level of 60-100%.
Although Japanese companies experienced a precipitous loss of mar-
ket share at the finished product levels in LCD and lithium ion batteries,
they maintain strong competitiveness at the component level. At the initial
junction, Japanese companies were the driving force behind the develop-
ment of these finished products and largely dominated the market.
Currently, however, they have experienced a rapid loss of market share
due to the growth of Korean and other foreign companies. For example,
Japanese companies’ global share of LCD finished product is only 44%,
which is in contrast to the large share of components for LCD and lithium
ion batteries.
Figure 1. World Market Size and Japanese Company’s Share
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Second, it is often pointed out that certain companies rely on chemi-
cals for their products (Itami 2009). In the 1980s, the boom period for
Japanese companies, machines, equipment, and tools increasingly relied
on electronics. Within this environment, Japanese electronics companies
grew and became the driving force behind the Japanese economy. With
this in mind, the dawn of the 21st century is experiencing a condition that
could be labeled “industries’ chemical reliance.” There are an increasing
number of cases in which improvements in the performance and quality of
finished products depends upon the improved quality of the chemical
components used in them. Hence, the importance of chemical companies
has increased and is expected to continue increasing in the future.
Third, a review of Japan’s recent economic history shows that the
chemical industry is now becoming the country’s driving force. It is diffi-
cult to determine which industries are pivotal industries within Japan’s
manufacturing sector. However, an overview of past trends suggests that
a manufacturing industry consisting of three or more companies and
ranking nationally in the top 50 of its type in terms of net profit could be
considered a “pivotal industry.” Table 2 shows the industries to which the
top 50 companies (in terms of net profit) belong to and a compilation of
their numbers. As shown, prior to World War II, textiles (cotton spinning)
and mining were pivotal Japanese industries, and during the high-growth
after the War, electric machinery, steel, chemicals, other machinery, and
automobiles were vital industries. In the 1980s, electric machinery and
automobiles were key industries. Although chemicals were once consid-
ered a major industry, it lost its position in the 1980s. At the dawn of the
21st century, however, three companies found their way into the rankings,
and the chemical industry regained its position as a key industry.
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Evidently, the chemical industry in Japan is beginning to resurge.
III. Within the chemical industry, which companies have a
strong competitive edge?
This section attempts to determine which chemical companies in
Table 2. Trends in Industry Consists of Net Income Rankings Top 50 in Japan
Year
Business
１９２９ １９４３ １９５５ １９７３ １９８７ ２００２
Chemical １ ２ ４ ３ １ ３
Pharmaceutical ０ ０ ０ ０ ０ ５
Sugar Manufacture ３ １ ０ ０ ０ ０
Cotton Spinning ４ ３ ２ ０ ０ ０
Paper Manufacturing ３ １ １ ０ ０ ０
Petroleum １ １ ４ ０ １ ０
Machinery ０ ３ ２ ３ ０ ５
Electric Machine ０ ２ ３ ７ ６ ４
Automobile ０ ０ １ ３ ３ ４
Steel ０ ７ ５ ４ １ ０
Mining ３ ４ １ ０ ０ ０
Railway ６ ２ ０ ０ ０ ３
Electric Power １０ ７ ５ ２ ６ ６
Communication ０ ０ ０ ０ １ ３
Finance １１ １０ １３ ２１ ２８ ７
Retailing ０ ０ ０ １ ０ ４
Others ８ ７ ９ ６ ３ ６
Total ５０ ５０ ５０ ５０ ５０ ５０
Source: Yamazaki (2004)
Note: Number is the number of firms which went into the rank.
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Japan’s chemical industry possess a strong competitive edge. First, we
calculated the ratio of operational profitability to overall sales volume for
40 Japanese chemical companies in a 10-year span, from 2000 to 2009.
Specifically, the analysis was performed on companies having over 100
billion yen in sales volume in 2000 with over 30% of sales volume com-
prising chemical products.
The results are displayed in Table 3. Table 3 shows the average
return of sales (ROS) over 10 years for the 40 analyzed companies and
their sales volumes in the final year, 2009. The top 10 companies in terms
of ROS are highlighted. This table shows the profitability of large
enterprises such as Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings, Sumitomo Chemical,
and Mitsui Chemical, were relatively low. While many highly profitable
companies are medium−sized chemical companies that have one-fifth of
their counterparts. Even though medium−sized chemical companies’ sales
volume is small from an international perspective, they earn a high degree
of profitability (Table 1).
One argument is the strength of these medium-sized chemical compa-
nies relative to the global production of specialized chemical components.
One noteworthy example is a component used to create liquid crystal
panels. There are 10 key chemical components in LCDs. JSR (formerly
Japan Synthetic Rubber), which occupies the highest global share, supplies
over half of these chemical components worldwide, ranking it second in
the previously mentioned profitability rankings. Hence, an electronics
manufacturer company official stated: “Without JSR products, liquid
crystal technology would not be possible. JSR’s mark is consistently seen
in the improved quality and durability of LCD screens. JSR is one of the
largest players of distinction in the creation of the current market for
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Table 3. ROS (2000th) and Sales (2009) in Japanese Chemical Company
Rank
(Sales) Company ROS
Sales
(million Yen)
１ Mitsubishi Chemical HD ３．９％ ２，５１５，０７９
２ Sumitomo Chamical ５．７％ １，６２０，９１５
３ Asahi Kasei ５．９％ １，４３３，５９５
４ Toray ４．８％ １，３５９，６３１
５ Mitsui Chemicals ３．６％ １，２０７，７３５
６ Shin-Etsu Chemical １６．７％ ９１６，８３７
７ Teijin ４．９％ ７６５，８４０
８ DIC ４．０％ ７５７，８４９
９ Tosoh ５．３％ ６２８，７０６
１０ Nitto Denko ９．８％ ６０１，８５９
１１ Ube Industries ５．７％ ５４９，５５６
１２ Toyoda Gosei ５．２％ ４９５，００２
１３ Hitachi Chemical ７．２％ ４５５，２８７
１４ Idemitsu Kosan ３．３％ ４３７，７６２
１５ Kaneka ６．９％ ４１２，４９０
１６ Mitsubishi Rayon ７．３％ ３６５，０４７
１７ Maruzen Petrochemical ３．２％ ３４５，８２１
１８ Kuraray ８．９％ ３３２，８８０
１９ Denki Kagaku Kogyo ７．７％ ３２３，８７５
２０ Daicel ７．３％ ３２０，２４３
２１ Toyobo ５．７％ ３１８，７７３
２２ JSR １１．０％ ３１０，１８３
２３ Tokuyama ７．８％ ２７３，１５４
２４ Chisso ７．５％ ２６１，１７０
２５ Niippon Shokubai ６．４％ ２４４，３１７
２６ Toyo Ink ４．３％ ２２６，０７４
２７ Zeon ６．９％ ２２５，８７８
２８ Yunitika ４．９％ １８２，２３９
２９ Nippon Steel Chemical ５．８％ １７９，３８１
３０ Sumitomo Bakelite ６．２％ １７０，８４３
３１ ADEKA ８．１％ １５９，９９７
３２ Central Glass ７．４％ １５４，６２３
３３ Nissan Chemical Industries １０．７％ １４９，０３６
３４ Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg ４．４％ １４３，９２８
３５ NOF ５．５％ １４３，３８４
３６ Kureha ６．４％ １３４，６０６
３７ Nippon Soda ４．０％ １３２，４８６
３８ FP Corporation ５．０％ １２４，９１８
３９ Takasago International ４．９％ １１４，３４７
４０ Nifco ８．７％ １０７，５０５
Source: Annual Security Report (2001-2010)
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liquid crystal televisions.” In examples similar to JSR, Kuraray Co. pos-
sesses 80% of the global share of polarizing plate material (poval film),
while Daicel holds 80% of this share for raw materials needed to create
polarizing plate protective film. Each of these companies occupies the
highest global share for their respective industries. Furthermore, Chisso
Co. holds the second highest global share of liquid crystal production. The
liquid crystal market is oligopolistic, with participation shared by two
companies: Chisso Co. and Merck of Germany. The same principle of
medium-sized businesses being more profitable than large enterprises
equally applies to lithium ion batteries, which chiefly comprise four com-
ponents. Among these, the global share of Japanese companies is 40% for
positive electrode goods, 60% for negative electrode goods, 45% percent
for electrolytes, and 65% for separators.
IV. How did medium-sized chemical companies establish their
current market positions?
Here, we explore how Japanese chemical companies succeeded in
developing (innovating) specialized chemical products that became the basis
for their current success. The history can be divided into three major
stages.
The first stage includes searching for suitable markets for the com-
pany. This occurred primarily in the 1970s. With abundant financial
resources, the zaibatsu-centered large enterprises chose to diversify into
fields such as pharmaceutical manufacturing. On the other hand, having
less access to financial resources, medium-sized companies aimed at mar-
ket diversification that fit their individual business strengths. Furthermore,
because medium-sized companies were technologically inferior, they
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needed to find markets that did not put them in direct competition with
large domestic enterprises or those in Europe and the U.S. The market
satisfying these conditions was the product area especially created for the
electronics industry. The 20th century could be called the “Era of the
electronics industry” due to the advent of various electric and electronic
products during the time. In the 1970s, the production of these products
gradually began requiring chemical products as parts and materials. This
new area had a small market scale and there were not many competing
companies. Moreover, from a financial perspective, it was not an area
that incurred a large amount of research and development costs, such as
those required in the pharmaceutical or pesticide industries. Due to these
conditions, Japanese medium−sized chemical companies focused on par-
ticipating in the area of products for the electronics industry. Examples of
early expansion into the arena of electronics materials include Shin-Etsu
Chemical’s pioneer efforts in creating electronics materials in 1970,
Hitachi Chemical beginning production of photoresist film, and JSR
making the most of their own technology by starting the development of
resist (photo-sensitive film).
The second stage included technology accumulation through partner-
ships that occurred during the 1980s until the first half of the 1990s. As
now and before, to develop electronic materials, information gathered
from customers is extremely important because, if the newly introduced
electronic material is not actually installed into a finished product, evaluat-
ing the quality and performance is difficult. Therefore, collaboration with
customers to improve products after actual installation must not be
neglected. With increased customer–supplier interaction, the strong
competitive edge that Japanese electronics companies held in the 1980s
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benefited Japanese chemical companies. Detailed input from customers
greatly improved the quality and performance of the products manufac-
tured by Japan’s chemical companies. For example, Hitachi Chemical was
able to accumulate electronics−related knowledge and technology through
its interaction with the large-scale semiconductor manufacturer and parent
company, Hitachi, Ltd. Furthermore, large-scale enterprises did not
acknowledge the electronics sector as a desirable market and were late to
enter the arena. Hence, medium-sized chemical companies, the early
entrants, were able to acquire an oligopolistic position. At this point,
however, the role of chemical products in improving the performance of
finished products (for example, electronic goods) was still small, and an
oligopolistic market share did not directly correlate to high profits. Thus,
this period could be considered the preparatory period before the rapid
progress that was later experienced by Japan’s chemical companies.
The third stage is the period of maintaining a high global share and
realizing high profits. This period lasted from the mid-1990s onward.
Electronics-related Japanese companies, with which chemical companies
formed partnerships in the previous stage, lost their international
competitive edge in the 1990s. However, Japanese chemical companies
that supplied products to those enterprises were quick to form new
partnerships with Korean and Taiwanese manufacturers that emerged as a
result of the loss. Japanese enterprises were technologically superior to
Korean and Taiwanese electronics companies, which lacked advanced
technologies and component. So they challenged Japanese enterprise by
purchasing the latest materials produced by Japanese chemical companies
even before Japanese enterprises used those same products. An example of
this is the ARC developed by Nissan Chemical. As a result, Japanese
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chemical companies continued to hold an international competitive edge
on parts and materials, despite Japanese enterprises losing their dominant
position in finished semiconductor and LCD products. As this period
progressed, a situation developed in which the performance of chemical
products, which were parts and materials for LCDs and other finished
products, began to determine the performance of the finished products. In
this type of situation, wherein specialized chemical products were used as
raw material in a variety of product fields, multiple industries’ reliance
upon chemical products progressed rapidly. This situation also raised the
status of chemical companies. Unlike the manufacturing of LCD panels
and similar products, which are easily reverse engineered, the “inability to
discern the make-up of the product by just looking at it,” rendered
chemical materials a business field that was not easily penetrated. As a
result of the emphasis placed on their parts and materials, as well as the
difficulty of entering the market, Japan’s chemical manufacturers
experienced heightened bargaining power and improved profits, much
like Intel’s competitive edge in the personal computer industry. The
oligopolistic position that Japan’s chemical companies gained in electron-
ics materials markets finally became associated with high profits. A
typical example is JSR, which experienced a significant operating profit
margin increase from 4.0% in the 1980s and 2.9% in the 1990s to 11.0%
in the first decade of the 21st century.
V. The success of innovation and profit generation cycles
This section outlines the innovation process realized by Japan’s
medium-sized chemical companies. We selected 12 highly profitable
Japanese chemical companies whose common innovation processes that
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led to high profits. The summary of these is shown in Figure 2. The
following section touches discusses these processes and the individual
situation of each company. In particular, the behaviors of the five compa-
nies occupying the top five spots in terms of profitability–Shin-Etsu
Chemical, JSR, Nissan Chemical Industries, Nitto Denko Corporation, and
Kuraray Co., Ltd–are broadly introduced.
First, Japan’s medium-sized chemical companies made careful choices
about which new product field they should enter. Their choice of markets
was based on two standards: (1) ability to apply their own technology,
and (2) a niche area. The ability to acquire an oligopolistic market
situation was critical to the realization of high profits. This point will be
further deliberated upon later in this paper. One of the reasons for their
targeting small markets was the high prospect of achieving an oligopolis-
tic market situation within those markets.
The specific trends for each company are outlined below. Nitto
Denko Corporation managed their activities in accordance with the slogan
“Global Niche Top.” The company was so committed to this strategy that
Figure 2. Innovation Process for Medium-Sized Chemical Companies
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they registered this slogan as their trademark. Nitto Denko’s aimed at
maintaining a stable competitive advantage by focusing on several small
markets ranging from 1 to 100 billions Yen in market scale. They then
raised the barriers to entry by maintaining an overwhelming share.
Furthermore, the company did not consider their niche as a simple
opening, but defined it as “a sector that is both essential and advanced.”
Moreover, Nitto Denko continued to expand into business areas, while
consistently focusing on their signature technology; adhesives. Similarly,
Kuraray Co. Ltd. felt that “although the market may be small, we will be
able to take the initiative if we lead in share,” and focused on earning
profits by holding global shares of product niches and taking advantage of
their technological strengths. Kuraray chose business fields based on three
conditions: (1) utilizing their company’s strengths, (2) allowing initiatives
with potential to gain a high share of the industry, and (3) not following
other company’s strategies. Subsequently, Kuraray proactively expanded
into product areas that utilized the company’s core technology. Specifi-
cally, the company created new products by expanding vinylon and poval
technologies, which were successful global industrialization efforts. Within
these technologies, poval film, made of poval and film, is used as the
chief material in polarizing plates in LCDs. Kuraray produces 80% of
these products.
Second, these companies attached great importance to customer
interactions and joint development with client companies during the inno-
vation and development of the products. For example, JSR created the
photoresist jointly with Toshiba, the user of the product. Nissan Chemical
Industries also collaboratively developed “silicon wafer polishing slurry”
with their customer. In addition, many companies have begun sending
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technology experts and researchers to promote dialogue, gather informa-
tion, and resolve problems at client companies. JSR sent the researchers
who developed specific products to the customer companies to further
promote their products and resolve any issues. This type of interaction
brought about two advantages for chemical companies. (1) Engaging in
joint development with customers led to successful innovation of unique
products in niches that differed from other companies. (2) Chemical
companies were also able to improve their technological strengths through
interaction with users.
Third, the successful development of unique products led to an
oligopolistic market position associated with high profits, as previously
mentioned. Chemical products cannot be reverse engineered in an attempt
to understand their composition. Even if their composition is known,
the extremely important know-how of reaction times and temperature
adjustments are difficult for other companies to discover. Hence, new
entry into the field is not easy. It follows that, within these product fields,
oligopolistic situations were created and the bargaining power of chemical
companies increased within their supply chains. For example, Shin-Etsu
Chemical successfully signs several long−term sales agreements for its
silicon wafers, for which they hold the largest global share. Kuraray
successfully raised prices for their poval film, even while prices for
finished products were trending downward.
Moreover, once these companies create an oligopolistic situation, they
strive to maintain that position. Through proactively investing in facilities
during periods of expanding demand, these companies are careful not
to provide potential competitors the opportunity for new entrance. An
example of this is JSR’s strategy in the use of their display materials. This
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company dominated the market by proactively investing in facilities, while
maintaining its lead in technology. In contrast to Japan’s electronic enter-
prises, which suppressed facility investment and reduced competitiveness
during and after the 1990s, Japan’s chemical companies continued to
proactively invest in facilities during the same period.
To maintain an oligopolistic position through proactive investment in
facilities, it is necessary to choose target markets that do not have the
immediate potential to become large scale. The reason is an increased
possibility of attempted entrance by other competing companies, such as
large enterprises with abundant resources or technological strengths
targeting a large-scale market. However, when the market is small, larger
enterprises are not much attracted toward it. For example, Mr. Asakura,
JSR’s former President, stated that he was confident that the company
could compete with large-scale enterprises in the field of photoresist, their
main product, because of the small size of the product market. He
believed that large enterprises would not consider the market as their main
business target for the future. Hence, Mr. Asakura believed that large
enterprises would not make large investments in the development of this
product. In contrast, because the photoresist business was a relatively
large market from the viewpoint of a smaller enterprise such as JSR, they
were willing to invest more energy and manpower in developing the
product than were larger enterprises２）.
Fourth, once created, oligopolistic situations led to cycles of
dominance that lead to further market domination. This was due to the
２） Shigeru Matsushima and Kazumi Nishino “The Oral History of Tetsuo
Asakura,” Innovation Management Research Center, Hosei University, 2010, p.
151.
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crucial role played by information, as an invisible asset possessed by
medium-sized companies. When client companies experienced problems
or found areas of improvement for the chemical parts and materials they
purchased, they took the discussion to the companies that they believed
possessed the best ability to address them: these with the largest market
share. With this information, top companies are able to focus on research
and development and redesign or enhance production facilities such that
they quickly supply cutting-edge materials to their clients. Using informa-
tion in this manner, it is possible for enterprises to lower their uncertainty
about the future and viability of their innovation process.
An example is the situation experienced at Nitto Denko Corporation.
Mr. Muguruma of Nitto Denko Corporation said, “Once you claim the
largest share, you have first access to a wide range of information. We are
able to discuss a variety of details with customers from the conceptual
stage of new product development. We are extremely grateful for this.”
Because the materials used in electronics generally have short life spans,
being first in line for customer information has critical significance.
However, companies that are not within the top ranking of market share,
find it difficult to establish customer loyalty and obtain fresh information.
Hence, it is possible for companies that have garnered a large market
share to build barriers to entry for new participants, along with preserving
predominance over rival companies in terms of information. In this
manner, dominance leads to further domination.
VI. Conclusion
This paper clarifies the following: (1) In Japan, the chemical industry
faces increasing expectations to become the pivotal industry for the next
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generation. One reason is found in the large global share of specialized
chemicals products market held by Japanese companies. (2) In Japan’s
chemical industry, it is not large enterprises, but rather medium-sized
chemical companies that have high profitability and global shares in their
markets. (3) The reason for the strength of these chemical companies is
their possession of a large global share of specialized chemical products.
Japan’s medium-sized chemical companies have avoided competition with
large domestic enterprises as well as with U.S. and European enterprises.
Further, they have tried to enter markets that are both small and newly
emerging, namely the electronics materials field. The profitability of
Japan’s medium-sized chemical companies, which function under
oligopolistic conditions, has increased in conjunction with the heightened
importance of chemical parts and materials in finished goods. (4) The
process for successful development of specialized chemical products by
these companies is as follows: First, these companies capitalize on their
unique technology by intentionally choosing and entering a market that
has the potential to provide a dominant position. Then, they develop
unique niche products and build dominant positions in collaboration with
their clients. Thus, these companies are able to reap high profits under
these oligopolistic practices.
In conclusion, the following additional points merit attention. Many
companies in developed countries prescribe withdrawal from business
areas when profits begin to shrink. However, this is not the only solution.
Although expectations are rising for Japan’s chemical sector as a pivotal
industry for the next generation, it is not an emerging industry, such as IT
or biotechnology. Yet, future growth in the chemical industry is expected.
Reviewing Japan’s highly profitable chemical products reveals that the
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basic technology for these products is not new. There are many cases of
innovatively re-utilizing a company’s traditional technology. For example,
poval film, the main product of Kuraray Co. Ltd., was developed by the
company in 1950 and was once produced as a material for synthetic fiber.
Although, later it was completely eliminated as a raw material for
synthetic fiber, another use later emerged in the early part of this century
as a component material in LCD screens. Manufacturing companies in
industrialized countries have employed a strategy of raising stock prices
by amputating old businesses. However, it must not be forgotten that
raising a company’s long-term performance and stock value can be
accomplished not only by cutting out those businesses, but by refocusing
them using technology as the basis for their growth.
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